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Complex processes and challenges typical 
for the development of contemporary society 
require adequate scientific efforts for the 
registration and analysis of the forming patterns 
and tendencies. In this regard, one of the 
tasks of scientific search is the creation of the 
categories that would reflect such processes and 
challenges to the full, being able to explain the 
new appearing social realities, suggest solutions 
for the new economic, political, moral and other 
problems. Legal science is not an exception, 
suffering from significant deficit in the field 
of the most general concepts, justified from 
the methodological point of view (assuming a 
certain philosophical, scientific conceptuality), 
that could be used for comprehensive research 
of the complex, contradictory and multifaceted 
processes observed in the legal development of 
various countries.
Among such concepts going through the 
process of formation at the turn of the 21st 
century, we may outline the category of legal life1, 
which can be interpreted as a form of social life, 
manifesting itself predominantly in legal acts and 
legal relations characterizing the specificity and 
level of legal development of the given society, 
the relation of subjects to law and the degree of 
their interests’ satisfaction2.
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This is the category serving to reflect the 
complexly developing and contradictory legal 
reality, the inextricable connection of the diverse 
legal phenomena with all other spheres of social 
life, e.g. economic, political, moral, religious etc.
Within the context of modern conceptual 
and categorical apparatus of legal studies, the 
legal life category is intended to compensate the 
well-known lack of methodologically relevant 
categories, reflecting the whole spectrum of 
legal phenomena. It gains special prospects 
considering the features of post-classical stage 
of scientific rationality, which introduces new 
criteria for the understanding and interpretation 
of being. Along with that, having entered the field 
of legal theory, the category began to go through 
these or those “waves” of critical remarks. The 
main reason for it was its exposure to traditional 
(classical) scientific thinking measures, which 
blocked the methodological potential specific, for 
the legal life category, leading thereby to certain 
problems in the process of its identification 
within the system of theoretic-legal concepts 
and categories3.
The question became a debating point 
from the very beginning4. Moreover, the 
fact of attention to the problem itself means 
that it required deeper consideration5. 
At least, there are the following aspects 
that need to be settled. First of all, it is 
necessary to determine the advantages of 
introducing the legal life category into the 
structure of conceptual and categorical 
apparatus of law theory; secondly, to reveal 
the methodological prospects of applying 
this categorical matrix to legal problem 
analysis; thirdly, to justify the fact that legal 
life can serve as an object of legal science 
that does not only suggest rich material for 
research, but also brings practically all legal 
methodology to the state of “readiness”, as 
“methods” only make sense in the presence 
of an appropriate “object” of search.
Characterizing the first of the 
mentioned aspects, we should also remark 
that separation of legal science with regard 
to the use of so-called “life strategy” 
of cognition of the legal phenomena 
world from other fields of humanitarian 
knowledge looks unreasonable. In political 
and economic science the terms of political 
life, economic life etc. have already acquired 
the appropriate categorical status6. This 
complex and multi-aspect concepts are 
used to reflect some complex phenomena of 
politics and economics. Moreover, we can 
suggest that the arrival of the mentioned 
fields of research to the necessity to use 
these concepts was neither artificial nor 
strained; it is quite evident to be the result of 
certain objective processes of development 
of scientific knowledge, and tendencies 
of moving on to the next levels (types) of 
rationality7.
And if it is so, why does not legal 
science accept these simple facts and does not 
step on these lines (tendencies) of scientific 
knowledge development? The heuristic 
advantages of such innovations are evident. 
They bring a new categorical matrix, 
which is the concept of legal life, without 
blurring the object of legal knowledge, but 
bringing it not only to a technical (legal-
dogmatic), but also a truly social (social-
legal) character, which is exactly what legal 
science is intended to be in its purpose. And 
in this case, “if ‘organization of the legal 
life of the society (Italics by A.M., V.T.)’ 
is considered as the base for the subject of 
general legal theory..., then the conceptual 
conclusions and postulates of general legal 
theory shall be the theories of functioning 
legal requirements not only within the legal 
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system, but also within the system of social 
life of society”8. The so-called “pure” 
jurisprudence does not even attempt to see 
these simple truths, though it is obliged to 
accept them sooner or later, when “life” 
forces it to.
The discussion around the scientific status 
of legal life of society arose because this concept 
began to claim for what until recent time the 
term of “legal system” claimed for: for becoming 
an ultimately wide category encompassing all 
legal phenomena. In this regard, N.I. Matuzov 
remarks that “recently some legal experts began 
to introduce, besides the established category of 
“legal system”, common both in our country and 
abroad (being an extremely wide, collective and 
multi-element concept), a parallel concept, which 
would be more capacious to their minds: that is 
the concept of legal life”9.
However, it is evident that the mentioned 
categories should not be considered as parallel or 
equal. It appears that inclusion into legal system 
of non-systematic phenomena that can have 
a feature of “legal” would hardly be efficient, 
as, though being directly related to law, they 
may contradict it: those are, for instance, legal 
vacuum, legal chaos, legal alienation etc., i.e. all 
the phenomena that fallout from the systematic 
bonds, destructing them but still present in 
the life of society itself. Would the category of 
“legal system” be ready to cover all these non-
systematic phenomena, even if its theoretical 
and methodological frameworks are forcedly 
widened (as, one should admit, a systematic 
approach does not exclude the consideration of 
negative phenomena and “entropy” in the system 
as certain manifestations of systematicity and 
systematic mechanisms)10? Would the legal 
system doctrine (theory) accept these aspects, 
which is also questionable; and if yes, does it 
really need it11?
The legal life term, including the legal 
system term, encompasses more than just static, 
but, first of all, the dynamic processes happening 
in the legal field and contains not only systematic, 
but also non-systematic segments. As it was 
rightfully remarked, “legal life is a process, it is 
the reality in its dynamics that sooner or later, 
but always arrives at the crystallization of legal 
relations or their destruction,… opposed to the 
legal life term, the legal system term describes 
society from the point of view of one structure as 
a product of social processes’ crystallization”12.
Unlike the legal system category, the legal 
life category bears a somewhat different meaning 
and performs a methodological task to consider 
legal phenomena in a wider way (and here we 
start the brief description of the second of the 
mentioned key aspects of the problem). Legal life 
can be considered as the general whole, which 
justifies and unites all other legal phenomena 
into an integrity (the use of the “integrity” term 
assumes the use of the “integrative approach” 
standing behind it and completing the “systematic 
approach”)13. 
The presence of “life” or “living world” 
category (phenomenological tradition) in the 
foundation of studying the legal phenomena world 
makes it possible to make an attempt of building a 
perceptual vision of this world based on life (legal 
life). With the legal life category the process of 
cognizing law itself will acquire an integrated 
character, encompassing the whole spectrum 
of initial and derivative, static and dynamic, 
normative and non-normative, positive and 
negative, organized and disorganized, material 
and spiritual legal phenomena, uniting them into 
a whole, demonstrating them as a “summarized 
totality” of legal life.
Being a complex and an ultimately 
generalizing category, from the view of 
methodology and within the legal science 
framework, it, to our mind, can open the potential 
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of meta-systematic approach uniting various types 
of knowledge: firstly, the domain or actual and 
empirical knowledge based on the “immediate, 
external, single” elements of law14; secondly, the 
systematic knowledge that launches legal analysis 
to a wider orbit, assuming the consideration of 
law on different levels (law within the social 
system; legal system as a whole of social legal 
phenomena; objective law system)15 and, thirdly, 
the complex knowledge born on the basis of 
multi-aspect, multi-dimensional understanding 
and modeling of cognition objects, let those be 
systematic or non-systematic16.
Legal life shall therefore be regarded as 
an integrated object of general legal theory, 
as a “legal metasystem” (i.e. more than “just 
a system”). Therefore, the introduction of the 
“legal life” term into legal science terminology 
and granting it a certain scientific status 
transforms many research parameters, allowing 
to consider more than just the “external part” 
(positive, formal, rational, controllable), but 
also the underlying part of legal life that often 
slips away from the researcher’s eye (negative, 
informal, irrational, non-controllable). With this 
special theoretical-methodological construction 
it is possible to encompass the totality of all the 
forms of social and legal organization of society, 
along with the internal feature of law or legal 
features17.
The methodological technique contained in 
it is used to unite the formal and essential sides of 
law, to demonstrate the processes of emergence, 
development and extinction of legal forms in 
parallel with legal life itself “as the source of 
morphogenesis” (Simmel G.). It provides an 
opportunity to see not only the effect of mono-
orientation of law to the achievement of the result 
established in the regulation (the legal goal), but 
also the process of the legal form’s reaction to 
the continuously transforming social medium 
conditions. It is in the development of legal forms 
that “we learn the parallel of life and law. In any 
sense of the word, law is nothing but collective 
will; in this regard, just like natural law, it is a 
form or simply a spirit of the relations the matter 
of which is group living, or, in more universal 
words, the intertwining of will spheres … “18. 
To our mind, it is legal life that, as a 
phenomenon of social reality, self-sufficient due 
to its separateness from any subjective factors 
and self-developing due to some internal reasons 
transforming positive law into an efficient tool 
of legal influence, establishes the necessary 
communication bonds between the social subjects 
themselves, as well as between the social subjects 
and legal regulations. Encompassing the objective 
pre-requisites of complex subject-object-subject 
type of interaction, legal life makes up a dialogue 
between natural law and law as an element of 
noosphere, which, interpenetrating into each 
other, make up the conditions of social life’s 
existence on the basis of law.
Doubtlessly, such vision of the legal research 
object requires activation of methodological 
resources (third aspect of the problem), which in 
itself is a positive factor for law and legal science 
as a whole. With such understanding of what is to 
be studied (with the understanding of the whole 
legal diversity and depth of legal phenomena), 
the legal-technical tool set (including the logical, 
linguistic tools etc.) is not enough. As the object 
of research is not only (and not as much as) legal 
texts and forms of their formulation, but the 
whole environment of legal life, therefore the 
methodology has to be based on all the levels 
(from the philosophical as the highest and to the 
empirical as the lowest, from the general scientific 
to specifically legal). One should also notice 
that together with the traditional (classical) one, 
including dialectic, systematic etc., a significant 
role can be played by the new (post-classical) 
approaches and methods (synergetic, integrative, 
communicative etc.).
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For instance, it seems promising to 
use the potential provided by the synergetic 
approach which is used for the research of the 
“complexity” phenomenon, typical of legal 
life as of no other legal phenomenon. As K.V. 
Shundikov rightfully remarks in his work 
dedicated to justification of the potential of 
synergetic approach in legal science, it is 
required to concentrate the initial attention 
on the phenomenon of complexity of the 
studied object (law) and form the scientific 
approach correspondingly to interpret 
and to explain this feature of law. Only in 
this case one can expect the formation of 
the optimal patterns of formalization and 
regulation of the development process of 
the legal sphere of social life19.
The author makes another important 
remark that what the synergetic approach 
is able to change is not as much of the 
traditional idea of the formal and structural 
features of law (the internal aspect of the 
problem), but the “vision of the perceptual 
picture of its functioning and interaction 
with other factors of social medium, 
causing the present conditions of social 
and legal order in the totality of their 
influence”20. Therefore, we emphasize the 
aspect, external in its relation to positive 
law, which is a rule positioned within the 
sociological type of law cognition, with the 
synergy acting as a pre-requisite for the 
renewal and deepening of understanding of 
the social essence of law and the tendencies 
of legal life as a whole.
One of the theses presented by the opponents 
of introducing the legal life category into the theory 
of law is its incompliance with the understanding 
of law as a certain field of something “right”, 
positively legal. Thus, E.N. Chernykh notices that 
the “desire to encompass all known world of law 
and a specific form of social life in one category 
brings to the confusion of cognitive strategies 
and tools, and, consequently, to incoordination 
of constructs and elements. Even the name of 
the category, “legal life” which is the synthesis 
of the Things in Existence being “life” and of 
the Right being “legal”, reveals the eclecticity 
of its construction as a problem of uniting two 
ontologically different and usually opposed 
spheres: the actual reality and the sphere of ideals, 
regulations and values, which is the result of 
combination of such different cognitive strategies 
as sociological and statutory-axiological”21.
It is really eclectic, but it is the eclectics 
determined by life itself. Otherwise, what (what 
object) would the sought “right” be applied to, if 
not to the “thing in existence”, and how can the 
independence of both be achieved? It seems that 
the Kant’s theses of theoretical thinking criticism 
including the denial (impossibility of finding) the 
standards of “right” in the “things in existence”22, 
would hardly serve as a significant argument 
both in the issues of considering legal life to be 
a category of sociological-legal order (and, in 
this sense, a component of the terminological 
apparatus of general theory of law), and of law as 
a standard-axiological status which, nevertheless, 
does not lose its social character and has to be, 
therefore, regarded only in its connection with 
social life. The strictly dogmatic approach (with 
elements of subjective-idealistic philosophy) 
applied by the critics of “legal life” in this 
case, deprives us of the opportunity to see that, 
separated from life, law is just an empty “form”, 
closed for living contents.
Entering an imaginary discussion with the 
followers of such one-way (simplified) view 
over the legal reality which may be composed 
of only positive, rightful, legitimate phenomena, 
K.V. Shundikov convincingly argues that such 
interpretation of the system of legal regulation 
“means unawareness of its complex nature and 
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intentional simplification of the epistemological 
and methodological tasks of legal science, as 
there is a series of problems (problem of law 
formation and law functioning, in particular) that 
is impossible to set or study without going beyond 
the ‘strictly legal’ field”23.
We cannot but agree with such opinion. 
As remarked by S.S. Alexeev, who had done a 
lot for the establishment and development of the 
so-called objective concept of law: “Law and 
all parts of legal regulation mechanism exist 
objectively, presenting thereby real phenomena 
of social life”24.
Law is social reality, which is the only way 
for law to find its way to life: “the system of law 
is not real as such for being embodied in material 
forms, but it is real as, regulating the activities 
of individuals, it gets thereby included into the 
real process of life, becoming an element of the 
existing objective social relations”25.
The same synergetic approach can be used 
for deep and sufficient consideration of various 
dynamic (positive and negative) processes of 
legal life (stability and instability, cooperation 
and competition of the legal order parameters; 
progress and regress, cycles of legal development, 
consistent and occasional elements of legal life). 
It denies neither modernization of the “legal order 
concept” as a systematic component of legal life, 
nor the creation of a foundation for a new concept 
of legal forecasting (taking all possible crises 
and deviations into account) etc. It justifies the 
research prospects (quite material and demanded) 
that assist the further development of legal science 
and appear due to the application of the described 
synergetic approach26.
No doubt, the legal life research 
requires involvement of many other 
methods and approaches. No matter how 
paradoxical it may sound, but under the 
conditions of globalization the cultural and 
historical aspects of our country’s legal life 
require thorough studies, thereby calling 
for mew methodological tools. The task of 
modern methodology in our country is to 
find such dimension of law that would not 
break the integrity of this legal phenomenon 
with the spiritual order of Russia and its 
unique cultural world. For this reason V.N. 
Siniukov and T.V. Siniukova emphasize that 
“the legal life category introduced by A.V. 
Mal’ko is quite likely to fulfill the role of 
methodological concept of law even in the 
event of specific legal constructivization of 
the known legal objects. This theoretical 
task is extremely complicated”27. And 
here legal life would act both as an object 
of applying the appropriate methods 
(culturological, cultural and historical) 
and a methodological tool able to express 
the existing national, mental, cultural 
peculiarities of legal life of certain nations.
It is rightfully remarked that “the 
concept of ‘legal life of society’ reflects 
the inseparable bond of legal phenomena 
with all other spheres of society”28, that 
introduction of legal life as a category 
“reflects the development tendencies of 
Russian legal thought, leading it to major 
expansion of the legal reality boundaries”, 
that “legal thought has reached the point 
(stage, step etc.) when it requires to 
include the general cultural factors into the 
researcher’s view”29.
It is rightfully stated that “by today 
we have reached the stage when we need 
to treat the existing facts of Russian legal 
life from some new, uncommon positions: 
not from the formally legal, sociological, 
psychological, cybernetic or abstractly-
human ones, but through the prism of the 
national-historical and cultural-typological 
nature of Russian legal world for the sake of 
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studying its wholeness and systematicity as 
it is. There is no coincidence that it happened 
in the post-reformation period, when 
Russian legal science began to develop the 
category of legal life as an attempt to look 
at Russian legal phenomena from some new 
social-cultural and dogmatic positions. The 
category of legal life, to great extent, marks 
the achievement of a different, synergetic 
and comparative-legal aspect of studying 
national legal phenomena”30.
Therefore, legal life begins to take 
a well-proven position in the structure of 
legal theory. Its appearance in the scientific 
context brings a number of advantages. 
First of all, it concerns the development 
of terminological-categorical apparatus 
of legal theory: being an ultimately wide 
category, legal life of society enables 
the researchers to establish (clarify) the 
boundaries of other categories related to it 
in any way (“legal system”, “legal reality” 
etc.); to express the relations between 
these interconnected categories and see 
what such connections are manifested 
in; secondly, it expands the horizons 
of studying legal problems, transforms 
the research parameters enabling us to 
consider the details that used to fall out 
from the scientifically legal context; and, 
finally, this strategy of legal phenomena 
cognition opens up the resources of legal 
methodology, making it more demanded 
and efficient. All together, these advantages 
boost the further development of modern 
legal science, solving the functional tasks 
accompanying the scientific cognition of 
law.
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